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Abstract
This article analyzes the link between climate change and international migra-
tion. We use a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous climate
change, in which the production in the North generates climate change which neg-
atively aﬀects the productivity of the South. Our main ﬁndings are: (i) climate
change will increase migration; (ii) small impacts of climate change have signiﬁcant
impacts on the number of migrants; (iv) a laxer immigration policy increases long-
run migration, reduces climate change, increases North-South inequality if DRTS are
signiﬁcant; (v) a greener technology reduces long-run migration, provides a double-
dividend in favor of the environment, reduces inequality if the migrants' impact to
overall climate change is large. The preference over the policies thus depends on
whether the policy maker targets inequality, wealth, the number of migrants or the
environment, but the qualitative ranking between the policies does not change if the
policies are costly.
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1 Introduction
Without doubt there is a growing concern over how and whether climate change will aﬀect
international migration. Although the economic literature has dealt with many aspects
of migration, the treatment of the relationship between climate change and migration has
not yet been satisfactory. Our focus in this article is to shed some light on this dark area
of economic analysis.
The recently published Stern review on climate change advances an unambiguous message:
An overwhelming body of scientiﬁc evidence now clearly indicates that climate change is
a serious and urgent issue. The Earth's climate is rapidly changing, mainly as a result of
increases in greenhouse gases caused by human activities. (Stern, [39], p.3) This claim
is without a doubt now a widely accepted fact in the scientiﬁc community. Another
commonly anticipated point is that the poorest countries will be especially hard hit by
climate change, with millions potentially pushed deeper into poverty. (Stern [39], p.487)
Possible and predicted eﬀects of climate change include land loss due to sea level rise, loss
of biodiversity, productivity declines, warmer and drier climates or wetter regions and
more extreme weather events (see IPCC [26] ).
As some regions are proner to be aﬀected by several of these adverse eﬀects than others,
it seems logical that inhabitants of these regions will try to avoid those eﬀects. However,
many poor regions either lack ﬁnances to abate or they do not emit enough to have any
signiﬁcant impacts from abatement activity. Usually, mitigation or adaptation are then
proposed as the only possible ways of dealing with these problems. As ought to be clear
however, those regions that are already extremely poor and vulnerable even before climate
change impacts them, will be unable to mitigate or adapt in the usual sense. Therefore,
very often the only hope left for people is to move away from the inhabitable area to one
which might give them better living conditions.
It is this particular setting which shall be investigated in this article. We shall focus
on the link from human activity over climate change to international migration. The
main questions which we wish to explore are the following: What are the environmental
reasons for people to migrate? What are the welfare eﬀects? What could potentially be
welfare-improving? Which are the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies?
It is well-known that the eﬀects of climate change are diﬃcult to measure. The evident
lack of strong data thus requires a more thorough theoretical analysis of a kind which
we intend to pursue here. The ﬁrst section shall give an overview of the data which
exist on international migration and climate change. We then build upon a model similar
to Galor [19] and investigate, step-by-step, the key issues driving migration in a two-
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country, overlapping generations world with climate change and migration. As climate
change is a long-term phenomenon we shall mainly focus on the steady state perspective,
but nevertheless allow for the eﬀects of short-run interactions.
Migration between two countries or regions has traditionally been analyzed within the
Harris-Todaro model ([22]), see also Ghatak et al. [20] for a survey. The model of Harris
and Todaro explains rural-urban migration in a general equilibrium model. However, the
static framework of the Harris and Todaro model may miss endogenous feedbacks or can
only assume these exogenously. Models which are able to analyze these feedbacks are two
country models like Galor [19]. He analyzes the welfare eﬀect migration in a two-country
overlapping generations model where he allows for bilateral migration where migration
decisions are mainly driven by diﬀerences in preferences. Crettez et al. [12] extend Galor's
model to include land as a third production factor.1 Here we shall focus on climate change
as a possible driver behind migration decisions.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows: (i) climate change will most likely increase overall
migration; (ii) even small impacts of climate change can have signiﬁcant impacts on
the number of migrants; (iii) taking responsibility for its externality a laxer northern
immigration policy will increase world migration and worsen climate change; (iv) North-
South inequality may increase or decrease via appropriate green or immigration policy;
Finally, the type of policy is crucial for the preference over the one or the other, especially
if the North tries to pursue several targets simultaneously. The targets we look at are
welfare, the policy's implication for climate change on the eﬀect on North-South inequality.
2 Climate change and migration: facts and future
This section is designated to provide an overview of important facts on climate change
and migration, as well as to present reasons for the particular assumptions which we use
later throughout the article. In the ﬁrst part we summarize key facts on climate change
and in the second part we focus on the environment as a leading cause of migration.
1The literature has also focused on the impact of migration on the economy of the destination and
origin countries. Migration can aﬀect labor market outcomes such as wages (Borjas [28]) or unemployment
(Bencivenga [6]), pension systems (Razin and Sadka [37]) or human capital formation (Vidal [41]) and
growth (Beine et al. 2001).
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2.1 Climate change
The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) concludes that the emission of greenhouse
gases from human production activity led to an increase in CO2 equivalent concentrations
from 290 ppm to 440 ppm during the course of the past 150 years. The more greenhouse
gases accumulate in the atmosphere the more they will prevent the infrared radiation
emitted by the sun to escape the atmosphere of the Earth. This then leads to a warming
which is expected to lie anywhere between 2 ◦C and 6 ◦C for the next 100 years, depending
on the path we humans choose for economic development (see IPCC TAR [27]). Most of
these increases in greenhouse gases must be attributed to the rich countries. For example,
the estimates provided by Enerdata in its Energy Statistics Yearbook suggest that the
European Union, North America and Japan together account for close to 60% of annual
world emissions, even though they host only 16% of the world population.
The main reason for this disparity is the use of the amount of primary energy resources2 in
production, which accounts for most of the CO2 emitted into the atmosphere. The use of
these inputs diﬀers drastically between the developed world and the less developed world.
Estimates from the International Energy Annual 2004 suggest that Northern America,
Europe, Japan and China together account for roughly 65% of the total world primary
energy use. In comparison to this, the Least Developed Countries use roughly 5% of total
world primary energy (IEA [2]).
The costs of climate change can vary drastically, depending on the size of the change in
temperature. Whereas the IPPC in various publications suggests that an increase of 2◦C
from pre-industrial levels may lead to economic costs in the range of 2% to 5% of GWP
per year, increases above that level may lead to potentially catastrophic costs.
In addition, the distribution of the damages is extremely particular to regions. It is
expected that the less developed countries will have to face close to 80% of the world
damages from climate change. This is particularly troublesome for several reasons. Most
of the developing countries already face the problem of binding income constraints. It
is estimated that in 2004 around 800 million people were at risk of hunger (FAO) and
malnutrition accounts for approximately four million deaths annually. It is believed that
half of those deaths from malnutrition arise in Africa alone. The current estimates suggest
that a temperature increase of 2-3◦C will potentially raise the number of people at risk
of hunger by 30-200 million. If the temperature increases by more than 3◦C, which is a
likely scenario of the IPCC, then the number of people facing hunger could increase by an
2According to IEA, in 2004 approx. 80% of world total primary energy supply came from oil, coal
and gas.
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additional 250-500 million. It is also believed that most of these will be observed in Africa
and Western Asia (Warren et al. [36]). The World Health Organization even estimates
that an additional one to three million people will then die from malnutrition3, diarrhea
or malaria.
Another problem of the eﬀects of climate change concerns the productive capacity of
countries. For example, the value added to GDP from agriculture is around 33% for less
developed countries, whereas for upper middle income countries only 6.2% (WDID [4]).
In addition, around 54% of the developing world's population works in the agricultural
sector but only 7% of the developed countries' population. These numbers can be up to
90% high for some of the Sub-Saharan Countries (FAO [18]). The temperature in those
countries increased on average by 3◦C during the past decade whereas the total amount
of rainfall decreased by roughly 4% between 1960 and 2000. Some countries even face
decreases up to 20% like Burundi or Rwanda. This suggests that overall these countries
have become drier. If they however face binding income constraints, have a high share of
agriculture in GDP and in addition if most of the population is rural and works in the
agricultural sectors, then these countries will face more severe consequences from climate
change than can initially be grasped.
Remark 1 Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above:
(1) Developed countries are the main emitters and therefore the predominant source of
human induced climate change,
(2) Developing countries are likely to face the strongest impact of climate change.
2.2 Migration
Here we wish to give a list of examples where migration occurred due to environmental
factors. We shall then proceed to investigate what several researchers suggest will be the
future of migration from climate change in particular.
Examples are, contrary to what some critics might suggest4, in fact abundant. A quick
reading of the existing literature provides many cases. For example, droughts in the US
displaced more than 30,000 people in the 1930s (Rosenzweig and Hillel [38]); a tsunami
in Indonesia in 2004 displaced 500,000 people (FIG [34]); droughts in Burkina Faso or
3For example, Swart et al. [40] estimate that temperate cereals might be faced by yield decreases of
up to 22%, thereby substantially increasing food shortages.
4For a critical opinion see Black [7].
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Sudan from 1968-1973 displaced around 1,000,000 people (Afolayan and Adelekan [1],
Hugo [24]). 5
Several of these cases deserve an additional remark. In Sudan it seems that only a part
of the household migrates (the male usually) and then returns after the drought stops.
Similar observations hold for Ethiopia where the young generations seem of migration
when droughts occur (Afolayan and Adelekan [1]). This suggests two possibilities: either
the costs to migrate are too high for everyone to bear such that only a part of the house-
hold is able to leave; or people are particularly attached to their homes and expect better
times to come again. However, these droughts usually last a short period of time and are
therefore only transitory. One would expect that areas where irreversible changes in the
climate lead to a permanently higher level of aridity would not see return migration. This
is supported two-folded by Henry et al. [23]. Firstly, for the case of Burkina Faso they
show that people from arid regions are more likely to migrate (temporarily and perma-
nently) than those from wetter regions. Secondly they suggest that long-run migrations
are likely to be more inﬂuenced by a slow-acting process such as land degradation than
by episodic events such as droughts. A similar conclusion is drawn by Chen et al. [31],
who suggest the population distribution in China depends mainly on the proportion of
arable land. Therefore, if that proportion changes due to environmental deterioration one
must also expect a change in the population distribution.
Apart from droughts one can observe that extreme weather events also lead to permanent
migration. For example, according to Morris et al. [32], after a strong hurricane in
Honduras and Nicaragua in 1998 the amount of migrants to the US and adjacent countries
rose sharply. Clearly, economic deprivation thus induces people to migrate, but it can also
simply be in order to avoid the same event happening in the future. For example, even
one year after the Hurricane Katrina had passed, Louisiana had a 4.87% lower population
due to emigration (Les [10]).
In Indonesia a tsunami in 2004 displaced around 500,000 people (International Federation
of Surveyors (FIG) [34]) internally, meaning they did not leave the country. However, one
can expect that they increased the economic and social pressures in the areas they moved
into and will therefore eﬀect the migration decisions in those places. Thus, people who
were before on the brink of migrating might now ﬁnally decide to move.
Remark 2 From this quick overview we can draw a particular conclusion: Permanent
migration seems to occur because of irreversible or long-lasting problems like desertiﬁca-
tion or continuous environmental degradation which removes the subsistence possibility
5For more examples, see e.g. McLeman [30], Ezra [15], Morries et al. [32], Kaye [29].
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of people; or simply because people expect further extreme events in the future and try
to avoid these.
These results therefore point toward a further analysis of the eﬀects which climate change
has on the expected future migration decisions.
The future of migration?
It is estimated that the amount of people aﬀected by natural disasters has tripled to a
staggering number of 2 billion people over the course of one decade only. Approximately
211 million people are believed to be aﬀected each year. Scientiﬁc evidence suggests
that this amount is likely to increase the larger the change in temperature from climate
change, as this leads to more ﬂoods, extreme weather events and desertiﬁcation (IPCC,
Stern review).
Also, as approximately two billion people are living in arid, semi-arid and sub-humid
regions, one can expect that only small climatic changes will induce particularly large
damages there. For example, it is suggested that the resilience of many arid regions is
already weakened. Estimates conclude that up to 20 percent of drylands are degraded,
droughts seem to become more frequent (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) [3]),
groundwater depletion intensiﬁes and groundwater quality deteriorates due to increased
fertilizer use ( Brown [8] and Brown et al [9]). It is thus clear that if the temperature and
the weather variability increase as is expected, then the resilience of the ecosystems will
have diﬃculties to support further stresses.
Many people will then only have the option to leave their homes in order to ﬁnd a
place which is able to support them. For example, the number of migrants increases
annually by approximately three million people, half of which come from Africa. It is
believed that most of these come from rural areas with severe land degradation. Estimates
suggest that more than 135 million people could be at risk of needing to migrate due to
desertiﬁcation alone (INCCCD [25]), and roughly 200 million due to sea-level rise (Myers
[33]). If desertiﬁcation and land degradation thus continues as expected, then the number
of migrants will shoot up, too.
Another reason for migration can be the eﬀect of climate change on health and thus
working ability. Flavin and Tunali [17] inform that illnesses like cholera, malaria and
others are very likely to spread vastly due to increased temperatures and higher humidity.
They inform that an increase of around 3◦C can potentially increase mosquito-transmitted
diseases by up to two times in tropical regions and by up to 10 times in areas like Europe.
Higher water temperatures can increase the production of algae, which again can increase
the probability of cholera outbreaks. It is estimated that around 3 million people die from
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malaria each year with up to 500 million suﬀering near fatal consequences. Additionally,
around 17.3 million deaths worldwide (around 33% of total) are believed to be caused by
infectious diseases. These deaths are thought to be caused due to shortages of water which
result in more use of contaminated water and lower cleanliness (see World Health Report
(1996) [35]). The dark ﬁgures for lost working hours due to illness from infectious diseases
should by far exceed the deaths. If we use the same ratio as near fatal consequences
to fatalities for malaria (ratio of 170), this leads to a (certainly too large) ﬁgure of 3
billion people losing some working hours. This however can provide some estimate for
lost working hours or reduction in productivity. If this extrapolation is only marginally
correct, then this presumes a strong eﬀect of climate change on productivity.
Faced with these ﬁgures one cannot easily reject the need to further investigate the impact
of climate change on migration and its feedbacks. We shall therefore develop a theoret-
ical model which incorporates these feedbacks. Through this we expect to add to the
understanding of the relationship between the economy, migration and climate change.
3 The Model
Here we construct a two-country, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model. As
we wish to concentrate on analyzing international migration we shall simply assume that
ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers in a perfectly competitive world with international capital
mobility. Generations however ﬁrst analyze how much welfare they are likely to obtain
at home and then compare this to the welfare they might get from migrating to another
region. In case migration is expected to leave them better of, then they shall migrate. Our
approach is designed to understand, step-by-step, the welfare implications from migration
when climate change plays a signiﬁcant role for welfare. Most of the article will concern
itself with the steady-state perspective of our dynamic model. In terms of notation we
shall denote with small letters per capita, with large letters total population. The ﬁrst
subscript refers to the country, the second to the point in time. We write subscript i to
denote a solution which applies to both north and south, such that i = N,S. Constant
returns to scale will be abbreviated by CRTS, decreasing returns to scale by DRTS and
total factor productivity by TFP.
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3.1 The ﬁrm's problem
We assume that in each region there exists a representative ﬁrm which produces in a
perfectly competitive market using capital and labor as inputs. The production function
in each country is of a Cobb-Douglas type where we allow for decreasing returns to scale,
such that Yit = AitKαitL
β
it, and α + β ≤ 1.
The discussion on whether production is subject to DRTS or CRTS has been ongoing
for quite some while. We allow for both in order to have results which are as broad as
possible. DRTS have also been used in theoretical models by e.g. Facchini and Willmann
[16] and are empirically supported by the estimations of the Global Trade Analysis Project
(GTAP) as well as by other empirical studies (e.g. Basu and Fernald [5]). On the one hand,
DRTS makes one vulnerable to the replication argument, which is solely a theoretical
argument suggesting that a ﬁrm producing under DRTS can split in two and thereby
increase overall output. On the other hand, DRTS seems to be a realistic assumption
given the empirical results that we have. What we do here is give up a slight amount of
theoretical rigor in favor of what is the apparently more realistic assumption. A partial
reconciliation between the use of DRTS and the replication argument is that allowing for
DRTS can also imply that one views other unpriced and roughly constant factors (like
land or other externalities) as important other contributors to production. We would then
have for example land, L, such that Yit = BitKαitL
β
itL
1−α−β
i , and via simpliﬁcation arrive
at Yit = AitKαitL
β
it with Ait = BitL
1−α−β
i (see also Cigno [11] for a model with a three
factor CRTS production function and endogenous population).
TFP in the North is constant, ANt = AN , whereas the one in the south is ASt = AS(Tt),
where Tt is the change in temperature at time t from human induced climate change. We
view this as a proxy for the eﬀect that climate change bears on production. The assump-
tion of climate change aﬀecting TFP can be rationalized by taking TFP as accounting for
any residual factor of production which is unpriced. Firstly, assume TFP accounts for the
amount of land used in production, then increases in the sea-level or desertiﬁcation re-
duce the amount and productivity of land. Secondly, assume TFP captures health eﬀects,
then one can argue that climate change is expected to increase the amount of malaria
which has signiﬁcant impacts on the health and thus productivity of workers. Finally,
the assumption that climate change only impacts the south derives from the observations
presented in the previous section. We assume AS ≥ AS(T ), ∀T > T , where T denotes the
level of temperate without human induced climate change. This assumption allows us to
compare the diﬀerent scenarios with and without climate change.
Firms then maximize proﬁts according to max{Lit}Πit = AitK
α
itL
β
it − witLit, for i = N,S,
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where equilibrium wages are given by
wit = βAitK
α
itL
β−1
it . (1)
Following Hahn and Solow [21] we assume that in the case of DRTS the excess proﬁts are
distributed to the investors, which is the young generation of the previous period, such
that Πit = (1− β)AitKαitLβit, which gives a return to a unit of capital of
Rit+1 = (1− β)Ait+1Kα−1it+1Lβit+1. (2)
In the case of CRTS, we of course have 1− β = α and there are no excess proﬁts.
3.2 The generation's problem
The generations in each country choose according to a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst
step they calculate their maximum utility at home. In the second step they calculate
whether it is more proﬁtable for them to migrate or to stay in their home country.
In the ﬁrst step we thus have
max
sit
u(cit, dit+1) subject to (3)
wit = sit + cit, (4)
Rit+1sit = dit+1, (5)
for i = N,S, where wit refers to wages in region i at time t, u(cit, dit+1) is the utility of
consuming cit when young and dit+1 when old, sit are the savings and Rit+1 the return
on the savings. We shall use log-utility for simplicity, where u(cit, dit+1) = log(cit) +
ρ log(dit+1). This gives sit = ρwit/(1 + ρ). Consumption will thus be cit = wit/(1 + ρ) and
dit+1 = ρwitRit+1/(1 + ρ). We write indirect utility in the steady state as
u˜i = log
(
wi
1 + ρ
)
+ ρ log
(
ρRwi
1 + ρ
)
. (6)
Then, in the second step the agent compares whether his lifetime utility will be higher
when migrating, such that
∆i = u˜j − u˜i, if u˜j > u˜i,
= 0 if u˜j ≤ u˜i.
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If this diﬀerence is positive, then a proportion of the generation will migrate to the other
region. Furthermore, if an agent wants to migrate, this will cost him an amount cix and
dix, where x ∈ (0, 1) reﬂects adaptation costs in various forms. Indeed, we wish to keep
these migration costs as general as possible, allowing for both subjective and ﬁnancial
costs. Our preferred interpretation would be subjective costs though, which are reﬂected
in the ex ante probability of ﬁnding a job or in the welfare loss (expressed in consumption
units) of having to adopt to diﬀerent cultures and circumstances. In this sense, we avoid
putting an explicit structure behind the level of migration costs. What deﬁnitely also
aﬀects migratory costs are the government policies directed towards migration. Whereas
some countries are rather liberal on the amount of migrants that they take, other countries
restrict the inﬂow of migrants and regions like the EU even build migratory camps in
Africa to catch potential migrants even before they can attempt to cross the boarder.
>From this we obtain that an agent born in the South is in equilibrium indiﬀerent between
living in the South and migrating to the North if
log
(
x
wj
wi
)
≤ − ρ
1 + ρ
log
(
Rj
Ri
)
. (7)
The population accumulates according to Ljt+1 = Ljt+mit+1Lit and Lit+1 = Lit−mit+1Lit,
where mit ≥ 0 refers to the percent of people migrating in that point of time. We denote
the total population which has migrated as
∑t
s=1 msLs−1 = Mt. In the steady state we
then have LN = L¯N +M and LS = L¯S −M , where M >< 0.
3.3 International capital market
In the framework presented here we can solve for both the case of no trade in capital and
for the case of free trade. We assume that capital depreciates fully during the course of
one generation. This assumption for example ﬁnds support in de la Croix and Michel
[13]. No international capital mobility implies that savings sit in one region become
the capital kit = Kit/Lit of that region in the next period, sit = kit+1. Free trade in
capital requires that total world capital stock is equal to total world savings, such that
LNt+1kNt+1 +LSt+1kSt+1 = LNtsNt +LStsSt, and perfect competition on the international
capital market implies RN = RS, ∀t.
Henceforth we shall denote frictionless international capital markets as integrated and the
case of no international capital mobility shall be called autarky. We already start with a
ﬁrst important result which we provide in the subsequent proposition.
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Proposition 1 Given the optimization problem of the ﬁrm and the problem of the gen-
erations, the long-run results of the integrated case are equivalent to those of the autarky
case.
Proof 1 In the autarky case the interest rate is given by Ri =
(1−β)(1+ρ)
βρ
. As both
β and ρ are the same for north and south this implies that both interests rates are
the same. As RN = RS by assumption in the integrated case, we can solve for KS =[
AN
AS
(
LN
LS
)β] 1
α−1
KN , which together with the clearing of the world capital market implies
that the long-run capital stock is the same in both the integrated and autarky cases.
This proposition therefore allows us to derive the results without having to subsequently
compare both the integrated and the autarky case.6
3.4 The climate sector
The climate sector is as follows: The total stock of North's capital drives the amount
of emissions of CO2 equivalent gases, denoted Et. CO2 equivalent concentrations Zt are
increased by emissions and reduced by a natural decay. The resulting temperature is
non-linearly increased by CO2 equivalent concentrations.
Et = µKNt (8)
Zt = (1− δ)Zt−1 + γEt,
∆Tt = g(Zt),
with g′(Z) > 0 and g′′(Z) < 0 and initial condition T0 = T . Then, the temperature
change from human production activities aﬀects the productivity in the south, such that
ASt = AS(Tt). Our interpretation of the temperature change is that it measures the
deviation from the pre-industrial climate level caused by productive activity.
As observed in the previous section, we assume that emissions from the south are neg-
ligible. This assumption is even strengthened if we were to consider the South as being
composed of small developing countries only. We know that large emerging economies
like China or India represent 18.4% and 4.9% of the world's CO2 emissions in 2004, while
6It should be clear that this result only holds if preference and production parameters are the same
and in the absence of any taxation or subsidy.
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Western Europe, United States, Canada and Japan contribute together 46% of total emis-
sions. African countries and other developing countries like Bangladesh or small Paciﬁc
Islands represent negligible amounts of the world's CO2 emissions.
4 Solving the model
To summarize, we have the following equations at steady state:
wi = βAiK
α
i L
β−1
i , where AS = AS(KN) (9)
Ri = (1− β)AiKα−1i Lβi , (10)
KS =
[
AN
AS
(
LN
LS
)β] 1
α−1
KN , (11)
KN +KS = LNsN + LSsS, (12)
si =
ρwi
1 + ρ
, (13)
log
(
x
wj
wi
)
= − ρ
1 + ρ
log
(
Rj
Ri
)
, (14)
∆T = g
(γµ
δ
KN
)
. (15)
LN + LS = L¯N + L¯S. (16)
To remind, we have AS = AS(T ) with A′S(T ) < 0. At steady state we know that tem-
perature is a function of the capital stock in the North and with some abuse of notation
we shall denote AS(T ) simply as AS(KN). Equation (9) gives wages in each country, (10)
the interest obtained on investing a unit of capital, (11) is equality of interest rates on the
international market, (12) is the market clearing condition for capital due to international
capital mobility, (13) gives optimal savings in each country, (14) holds if no one from coun-
try i wants to migrate to country j, and (15) is the steady state temperature, a proxy for
climate change. For the moment we shall not introduce any policy considerations yet.
The following assumption is based on empirical evidence and helps us to focus our analysis.
Assumption 1 Throughout the article we assume that AN0 > AS0, meaning that TFP
in the north is higher at t = 0 than in the south. Furthermore, in accordance with the
data, we have L¯N < L¯S.
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Though the model implicitly allows for two-way migration, the conditions given in As-
sumption 1, which are easily veriﬁed through data, will imply that in the long-run only
one way migration will occur.
Proposition 2 summarizes the results in section 4.
Proposition 2 Given the problem as described in equations (9) to (16) we ﬁnd that
endogenous climate change is a signiﬁcant propagator of world migration and reduces per
capita welfare in both the North and the South.
Due to the various feedbacks involved we shall derive these results step-by-step, where we
ﬁrstly allow for no feedbacks and then switch them on one after the other.
4.1 Benchmark case
Firstly we assume no climate change eﬀect on total factor productivity and no labor
mobility but international capital mobility. The steady state capital stock will then be
given by Ki =
[
ρ
1+ρ
βAiL
β
i
] 1
1−α . This leads to wi =
[
βAi
(
ρ
1+ρ
)α
Lα+β−1
] 1
1−α and Ri =
(1−β)(1+ρ)
βρ
. We denote indirect utility in the benchmark case by u˜a and it will be given by
u˜ai = Φ +
1 + ρ
1− α log
(
βAiL
α+β−1
i
)
, (17)
where Φ = α(1+ρ)
1−α log
(
ρ
1+ρ
)
+ log
(
1
1+ρ
)
+ ρ log
(
1−β
β
)
. Given the utility and production
functions are the same, then in the case of CRTS the only diﬀerence between indirect
utility of the two countries comes from the TFP. By Assumption 1 we thus know that
u˜aN > u˜
a
S. Under DRTS a larger Li implies a smaller u˜
a
i .
In this benchmark case we obtain a temperature of
T a = g
(
γµ
δ
[
ρ
1 + ρ
βANL
β
N
] 1
1−α
)
.
The steady state change in temperature is therefore solely driven by the productive ca-
pacity of the North.
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4.2 Benchmark and migration
We now move to the case of benchmark with migration. The equilibrium condition for
migration from the south to the north then implies xwN = wS. Rewritten, we obtain the
condition that no one moves from the South to the North if
x1−αANL
α+β−1
N = ASL
α+β−1
S . (18)
A steady state in migration from the south to the north then exists7, where we denote
the steady state level of M as Mam, if x1−αAN L¯
α+β−1
N > ASL¯
α+β−1
S . We can solve for the
total amount of migrants in the steady state8, given by
Mam =
(AS)
1
α+β−1 L¯S − (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1 L¯N
(AS)
1
α+β−1 + (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
. (19)
We denote indirect utility in this case by u˜ami and it will be given by
u˜amS = Φ +
1 + ρ
1− α log
(
βAS(L¯S −Mam)α+β−1
)
, (20)
u˜amN = Φ +
1 + ρ
1− α log
(
βAN(L¯N +M
am)α+β−1
)
(21)
Thus we obtain that if one allows for migration, then u˜amS > u˜
a
S, whereas u˜
am
N < u˜
a
N .
Therefore, the south beneﬁts from international migration whereas the north loses. Under
CRTS there is no eﬀect on steady state welfare from migration.
Steady state temperature is then
T am = g
(
γµ
δ
[
ρ
1 + ρ
βAN(L¯N +M
am)β
] 1
1−α
)
.
Since there are now more people living in the North which all pollute according to the
northern living standards, this will unambiguously lead to an increase in emissions and
therefore long-run temperature.
7Proof: We check whether the equilibrium condition can exist by varying M along its domain
[0, L¯S ]. We get limM→0 x1−αANL
α+β−1
N > limM→0ASL
α+β−1
S > 0, and limM→L¯S x
1−αANL
α+β−1
N <
limM→L¯S ASL
α+β−1
S . Since x
1−αANL
α+β−1
N is a monotonically decreasing function of M and since
ASL
α+β−1
S is a monotonically increasing function of M from a positive number to inﬁnity we conclude
that a unique steady state exists if x1−αAN L¯
α+β−1
N > ASL¯
α+β−1
S .
8Under CRTS a steady state can only exist in the knife-edge case of x1−αAN = AS .
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4.3 Benchmark with climate
Here we shall assume that there is a climate change eﬀect on total factor productivity in
the South but no migration possibilities. We denote indirect utility by u˜aci . In this case
the North will grow to the same long-run level of capital as in the benchmark case and
end up with the same indirect utility, such that u˜acN = u˜
a
N .
The steady state capital stock of the south is however depending on the amount of climate
change induced by the production of the north. The productivity in the south can then
be written AS = AS
([
ρ
1+ρ
βANL
β
N
] 1
1−α
)
. Therefore, the indirect utility of the south at
steady state will be given by
u˜acS = Φ +
1 + ρ
1− α log
(
βAS(KN)L
α+β−1
S
)
, (22)
which implies that u˜acS < u˜
a
S < u˜
ac
N = u˜
a
N . As expected, the externality imposed by the
north on the productive capacity of the south reduces total welfare in the south.
Since there are no migrants in this scenario and since the integrated case is equivalent
to the autarky case, we observe no change in production in the north, and therefore no
divergence from the total emissions in the benchmark case.
4.4 Benchmark with climate and migration
We now extend the previous case by allowing for migration. A steady state in migration
from the south to the north then exists9, where we denote the steady state level of M as
Macm, given that x1−αAN L¯
α+β−1
N > AS(KN)L¯
α+β−1
S . The total amount of migrants in the
steady state is then given by
Macm =
(AS(KN))
1
α+β−1 L¯S − (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1 L¯N
(AS(KN))
1
α+β−1 + (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
. (23)
We know that ∂KN
∂M
> 0. This implies more climate change and therefore TFP in the south
with migration is lower than if one does not allow for migration. In terms of indirect utility
we can then conclude that u˜acmS < u˜
am
S iﬀM
acm ≥Mam. The denominator of equation (23)
is increasing when ∆AS < 0 and the nominator is increasing when ∆AS < 0. This comes
about because migration implies two things: Firstly,more migration means more climate
9Proof: limM→0 LHS > limM→0RHS > 0, and limM→L¯S LHS < limM→L¯S RHS.
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change which reduces income in the south; secondly, more migration implies higher per
capita steady state income in the south. It is this cumulative eﬀect where more migration
implies further climate change which leads to Macm > Mam. We can therefore conclude
that u˜acmS < u˜
am
S .
The strength of climate change will be given by
T acm = g
(
γµ
δ
[
ρ
1 + ρ
βAN(L¯N +M
acm)β
] 1
1−α
)
.
Therefore, T acm > T am. In this scenario therefore, not only the direct migration incentives
play a vital role, but also the cumulative eﬀects of more migrants. If more migrants also
increase emissions in the north and therefore further reduce income in the south, this can
imply a strengthening of the migration incentive and will increase climate change further.
4.5 A Data Experiment
Our objective is to give some numbers to these otherwise analytical results. This is
supposed to be viewed as a rough exercise which allows us to extrapolate some numerical
implications of the model. We take data from today, extrapolate into the future (year
2050), and then use these estimates as an approximation for the steady state values.
GTAP data suggests that World GDP in the year 2000 is 31.278 billion US $, of which
the US, Western Europe and Japan have 70%. We assume those will be the migrants
destination countries (North). The South is then composed of most of the remaining
countries of the world10. Assuming a growth rate of 1% for the North and 2% for the
South, we calculate World GDP in 2050 to be 36 bn for the North and 25 bn for the South.
Total world population is 6.6 billion, of which US, Western Europe, Japan currently hold
17%. In the year 2050, the estimates of the World Population Prospects are 1.1bn for
Europe plus Northern America, and 8bn for the rest of the world. In the year 2000, 52.5
million migrants born in the South live in the North (UN data and [14]). We take this
as the baseline case with migration but without climate change. The average sources of
GDP worldwide are: skilled plus unskilled labor, giving β = 0.44, and capital, giving
α = 0.37, which suggests signiﬁcant decreasing returns.
Knowing Y , α, L, β, we can use our Cobb-Douglas functional form Y = AKαLβ to
calculate Ki as follows: take the interest rate ri = αAiK
α−1
i L
β, then divide by Y , gives
r/Y = α/K. Solve for K, gives K = αY/r. We know α and Y , assume r = 1.02, then
10We do not consider Australia and New-Zealand in our calculations.
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we can calculate KN and KS. We then calculate Ai from solving the income equation for
A, giving A = Y/(KαLβ). Independent of the scaling, the ratio σ ≡ AS/AN is always the
same. Rewriting equation (23) as x = σ1/(1−α)(LN/LS)(1−α−β)/(1−α), we obtain the x that
matches the value of migrants in 2000, namely x = 0.27.
Having now constructed the variables that we need, we proceed to calculate the eﬀects of
climate change on steady state migration. Since there exists barely any data or knowledge
of the consequences of climate change on the productive capacity, we take a shortcut and
assume that climate change visualizes as a percentage decline in σ. Table 3 shows that
the proportion of migrants in the North, M/(L¯N +M), will change from 9% to up to 35%
if the ratio of productivity σ (=AS/AN) drops by up to 5%. This suggests that even small
impacts of climate change can lead to signiﬁcant changes in the number of migrants.
Table 1: Eﬀect of climate change on migration
decrease in σ 0 -1% -2% -3% -4% -5%
Migrants in 2050, (in millions) 98.77 150.95 205.80 263.45 324.02 387.64
change in migrants' stock 0.00% 52.84% 108.38% 166.74% 228.07% 292.49%
share of migrants (North) 8.98% 13.72% 18.71% 23.95% 29.46% 35.24%
share of migrants (Sorth) 1.23% 1.89% 2.57% 3.29% 4.05% 4.85%
share of migrants (World) 1.50% 2.29% 3.12% 3.99% 4.91% 5.87%
Source: GTAP, UN Population Division and own computations
The results in this section immediately raise questions of various concerns: Empirically,
how can we diﬀer between incentives for migration, namely purely utilitarian incentives
and forced migration? Ethically, what value do we give to space and place (or origin)
and is someone responsible for taking the migrants? Politically, how are we to deal with
possible migration of up to 35% of Northern country's population? Economically, what is
the eﬀect of various policies on the number of migrants, on the inequality between North
and South, as well as on the amount of climate change?
Though each of the above questions poses challenging problems, we are only going to deal
with the economic ones here. In the subsequent section 5 we deal with policies of the
North.
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5 Northern Policies
We shall now investigate the eﬀects of several possible policies undertaken by the North.
The ﬁrst policy is an immigration policy whereas the second one leads to greener produc-
tion. In the last part of this section we assume policies are costly and calibrate whether
the US or Europe would, in the long-run, invest more in green technology or immigration
policy. In the subsequent propositions, whenever we refer to 'abstracting from climate
change', we mean AS(Tt) = AS ≡ const, ∀T .
We assume that policies may certainly bear costs at the time they are implemented, but
these costs will be zero in the long-run. We believe this assumption holds true for example
for R&D expenditure in emission reductions: If a greener technology is developed once,
then it is clear that further R&D expenditure is not necessary. Similarly, immigration
policy which leads to a higher probability of obtaining a job for the migrants only requires a
discussion in the parliament. Thus, long-run costs can be assumed zero. We shall analyze
the impact of either policy now.
5.1 Immigration policy
We here interpret changes in immigration policy of the North as changes in migration
costs. A less restrictive immigration policy would then lead to lower migration costs (in-
creases in x). It is certainly true that many northern governments undertake immigration
policies in order to regulate the amount of migrants. Here one can imagine that the North
takes responsibility for the climate change which it imposes upon the South and therefore
relaxes its immigration policy. Our objective is to see the long-run eﬀect of changes in
immigration policy on the amount of migrants, the environment as well as on North-South
inequality.
Proposition 3 Abstracting from climate change, if immigration policy is relaxed, i.e. the
subjective migration costs decrease, then more people will migrate which unambiguously
increases the utility in the south and lowers that of the north. Including climate change,
this further increases the long-run number of migrants; may lead to a completely deserted
South; aggravate climate change; decrease or increase North-South inequality.
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The proof goes as follows. We can calculate the change in indirect utility from a change
in the immigration policy to be
du˜ami
dx
=
1 + ρ
1− α(α + β − 1)
∂Li
∂Mam
dMam
dx
. (24)
dMam
dx
=
1− α
1− α− β
1
x
(ANx
1−α)
1
α+β−1
[
A
1
α+β−1
S (L¯N + L¯S)(
A
1
α+β−1
S + (x
1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
)2
]
> 0 (25)
Conclusively, du˜
am
S
dx
> 0 for the south and du˜
am
N
dx
< 0 for the North. Intuitively, the increased
population pressure in the north will reduce steady state utility in the North, whereas the
higher per capita income will increase indirect utility in the South. This, of course, is a
direct implication of the DRTS.
However, things change slightly when we take climate change into account, too. We obtain
the result that the impact of changes in migration costs on indirect utility then crucially
hinges on how strong the feedback of migration itself is on climate change. Mathematically
we get
du˜acmS
dx
=
1 + ρ
1− α
[
1− α− β
LS
+
1
AS
A′S(KN)
∂KN
∂LN
]
∂Macm
∂x
, (26)
with A′S(KN)
∂KN
∂LN
< 0 and
du˜acmN
dx
= − 1 + ρ
1− α
1− α− β
LN
∂Macm
∂x
, (27)
where
dMacm
dx
=
∂Mam
∂x
1− ∂Macm
∂AS
∂AS
∂KN
∂KN
∂LN
. (28)
The nominator is positive and the denominator is positive if ∂M
acm
∂AS
> 0. However, calcu-
lating this derivative we get
∂Macm
∂AS
= − 1
1− α− βA
2−α−β
α+β−1
S (x
1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
L¯S + L¯N(
A
1
α+β−1
S + (x
1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
)2 < 0.
A necessary condition for an interior solution to Macm requires ∂M
acm
∂AS
∂AS
∂KN
∂KN
∂LN
< 1. This
condition holds only if changes in AS have small impacts on the number of migrants
or if climate change has minimal impacts on TFP in the South. Put diﬀerently, if the
migration costs change, then the impacts unfold subsequently as follows. Initially, more
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people wish to migrate since the costs are lower, and thus the perceived beneﬁt of moving
to the north is higher. The secondary eﬀect of this is, however, that more migrants pollute
more and therefore induce a further decrease in the productivity of the South. If migrants
have only a small impact on climate change, thenMacm will be insigniﬁcantly higher than
Mam. However, if the impact of migrants on total climate change is large enough and
climate change impacts the migration decisions strongly, then this could potentially lead
to a corner solution: All inhabitants from the South wish to migrate to the North. In any
case we can conclude that dMacm/(dx) > dMam/(dx).
The eﬀect on the environment is similar. Since temperature in steady state is T =
g(γµ
δ
KN), we can then deduce that climate change is somewhat proportional to changes
inKN . KN in steady state is given byKN =
[
ρ
1+ρ
βANL
β
N
] 1
1−α , implying that dKN
dx
depends
on dM
acm
dx
. Since we know that Macm > Mam, it is clear that climate change will thus be
intensiﬁed.
The eﬀect on inequality is as follows. We deﬁne North-South inequality simply as the
ratio u˜N/u˜S. Inequality is minimized when u˜N = u˜S and increases11 when the ratio
deviates from 1. Since we know that steady state per capita utility of the North in the
benchmark case is higher than the one of the South, then a reduction in inequality from
the immigration policy requires d(u˜N/u˜S)/(dx) < 0. This is equivalent to the condition
1 + ρ
1− α
[
− (1− α− β)
(
u˜S
LN
+
u˜N
LS
)
− u˜NA
′
S(KN)
AS
∂KN
∂LN
]
dMacm
dx
< 0.
The ﬁrst term inside the brackets is negative and relates to the DRTS. It vanishes if there
are no DRTS, since then indirect utility is not (directly) aﬀected by migration. Since
u˜S ↑ if Macm ↑, then due to DRTS fewer people can share more wealth. The indirect
eﬀect is given by the second term, which is positive. It relates to the eﬀect of migrants on
climate change. The more migrants move to the North, the more they will add to world
pollution and the stronger will be the climate change eﬀects in the South. This feedback
will work against equality. We can therefore conclude that world inequality will increase
or diminish depending on which of the terms is stronger.
5.2 Green Technology
Many researchers believe that technological improvements are the key means of relieving
production from the climate change constraints, especially given that preferences are not
11For simplicity we assume that u˜i > 0.
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expected to change suﬃciently. Furthermore, these investments need to happen now, in
order to prevent climate damages in the distant future. Researchers sometimes ﬁnd that,
due to discounting or uncertainties, it does not pay to take these investments now. Our
approach here relies on abstracting from those short-run problems and on only looking at
the potential eﬀect of an investment in green technology today on the long-run number
of migrants, climate change and North-South inequality in the future.
We therefore assume that at one point in time the North can invest in green technology
which reduces the amount of emissions per unit of production. The investment costs
will obviously have no impact on the production potential in the long-run since they
will be sunk. As we deﬁned climate change as T = g(γµ
δ
KN), with AS(T ) denoting the
impact thereof, then within the terms of our model, this means we analyze changes in
µ. Obviously, decreases in µ signify a greener technology. We collect the results in the
subsequent proposition.
Proposition 4 Adopting a greener technology will reduce the long-run number of mi-
grants; reduce climate change directly and indirectly; either increase or decrease North-
South inequality.
To prove the results presented in this proposition, we follow the approach from before and
derive
du˜acmS
dµ
=
1 + ρ
1− α
1
AS
∂AS
∂µ
+
1 + ρ
1− α
[
1
AS
∂AS
∂Macm
+ (1− α− β) 1
LS
]
dMacm
dµ
,
du˜acmN
dµ
= −(1− α− β) 1 + ρ
1− α
1
LN
dMacm
dµ
,
where
dMacm
dµ
=
∂Mam
∂µ
1− ∂Macm
∂AS
∂AS
∂KN
∂KN
∂LN
. (29)
We can calculate
∂Mam
∂µ
= − A
2−α−β
α+β−1
S
1− α− β
[
(x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1 (L¯N + L¯S)(
(AS)
1
α+β−1 + (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
)2]∂AS∂µ > 0
An interior solution forMacm either requires a small enough impact of changes in produc-
tivity on the total amount of migrants or a small impact of climate change on productivity
in the South. We then know that dMacm/(dµ) > dMam/(dµ).
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In order to sign the eﬀect of µ on u˜acmS we need to manipulate the ambiguous term in
the square brackets of du˜
acm
S
dµ
. Some manipulations together with the results of the last
paragraph give us
du˜amS
dµ
=
1 + ρ
1− α
[
1
AS
− 1
LS
A
2−α−β
α+β−1
S
(
(x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1 (L¯N + L¯S)(
(AS)
1
α+β−1 + (x1−αAN)
1
α+β−1
)2)]∂AS∂µ .
As ∂AS
∂µ
< 0, then du˜
am
S
dµ
< 0 if the term inside the square brackets is positive. Simple
manipulation shows that this holds if A
1
α+β−1
S + (x
1−αAN)
1
α+β−1 > 0, which is always true.
We can therefore unambiguously conclude that du˜
acm
S
dµ
< 0 and du˜
acm
N
dµ
< 0. Therefore,
investment in green technology is a win-win strategy in the long-run.
Since dMacm/(dµ) > 0, it is straight-forward to show that in the long-run the environment
is in a better state, as total production in the North is lower due to fewer migrants. In
addition, adopting a greener technology also bears a direct eﬀect on the environment since
the emissions per unit of capital are reduced. This could be called a double-dividend policy
in favor of the environment.
Our analysis of North-South inequality suggests the following. Our measure of inequality
is reduced if
−u˜N du˜
acm
S
dµ
− 1 + ρ
1− α
[
(1− α− β) u˜S
LN
+ u˜N
A′S(KN)
AS
∂KN
∂LN
]
dMacm
dµ
< 0.
An investment in greener technology (implying µ ↓) today leads to a reduction in the
number of migrants in the long-run. Fewer migrants increase per capita welfare in the
North, which raises inequality (second term). However, fewer migrants in the North
implies also less climate change, which raises productivity in the South and thus reduces
inequality (third term). In addition, climate change is directly reduced through the use of
greener technology, which again reduces inequality (inside ﬁrst term). Then, if the DRTS
in the South are not too large (inside ﬁrst term), this will imply an overall decrease in
world inequality.
5.3 Investment in clean technologies or in border controls
Should the government invest in greener technology or in immigration controls? Assume
the government has a ﬁxed amount of resources τ = τ¯ , then the budget constraint can
be written as τµ = τ¯ − τx. The northern government will choose the optimal share of
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tax revenues to allow to border controls by maximizing the utility of a northern citizen
subject to τx.
du˜N
dτx
=
∂uN
∂M
∂M
∂τx
The sign of du˜N
dτx
will determine if the government will spend more on border controls or
more on green technologies. Since ∂uN
∂M
< 0 the government decisions will depend on the
sign of ∂M
∂τx
. Thus for a given tax rate τ¯ , if dM
dτx
< 0, then the government will invest more
in border controls while reducing its investments in green technologies. The reverse is
true if dM
dτx
> 0.
Since the theoretical conditions do not provide interpretable results we shall give a numer-
ical illustration. Consider the North to be either EU-15 (EU) or North-America (NAM),
which comprises United States and Canada. Will each of these two regions spend more on
green technologies or on border controls? In order to address this issue we do a similar ex-
trapolation exercise as before and choose the following functional forms: AS(KN) =
AS
1+ωT
,
T = µKN , x = x¯1+aτxYN , µ =
µ¯
1+bτµYN
.
In 2050, populations in Europe and North-America there will be respectively LEU = 0.328
and LNAM = 0.328 bn of people, while in the south LS = 8.165. The share of migrants
from developing countries in EU and NAM corresponds to 10.13% and 4.9% in 2000. We
keep these shares to constant in 2050. We take the following values α = 0.37, β = 0.44,
ρ = 0.9, τN = 0.1 and GDP PPP equals to YNAM = 14.76 and YEU = 14.95 thousands bn
in 2000. We assume that per capita GDP increases by 1% in each of these two regions
and multiply by the respective populations to obtain the GDP in 2050. Following the
procedures from above, we obtain KNAM = 12.25 and KEU = 7.50, AN = 21.14 in
2050. TFP in the south is calculated as above, giving AS = 4.429. We set the unknown
parameters (subject to subsequent sensitivity analysis) ω = 0.05, b = 1 and a = 0.0065.
We know that µ = E
KN
and that emissions amount to ENAM = 6.05, EEU = 3.12 thousand
bn tons in 2000 in respectively North-America and in EU-15. We obtain µNAM = 1.13
and µNAM = 0.57 for 2000 and keep these values constant for 2050. Immigration costs
are calibrated as before: we obtain xNAM = 0.063 and xEU = 0.077. The parameters x¯,
µ¯, A¯S are then calibrated to match x, µ and AS.
We obtain, given the respective structures of both economies, that North-America will
invest more in immigration costs (τx = 84.66%) while Europe spends most of its tax
revenues on green technologies (τµ = 85.19%). Interestingly, we can already observe this
behavior currently. However, it must be said that this result rests solely on a per capita
utilitarian approach, neglecting any other ethical or political dimensions.
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6 Conclusion
In this article we investigate the relationship between climate change and international
migration. We make use of a two-regions overlapping generations model similar to Galor
[19] but allow for climate change to aﬀect the productivity in the South.
Our main ﬁndings are that climate change will most likely increase world migration and
that even small changes in its impact can imply signiﬁcant changes in the amount of mi-
grants in the long-run. A simple calibration exercise suggests the the number of migrants
increase by a factor of four if climate change reduces southern productivity by approxi-
mately 5 percent. However, from our empirical overview in the ﬁrst part of this paper it
is very likely that the reduction in southern productivity exceeds 5 percent in the future.
Thus, it goes without saying that migration is expected to re-shape world orders if it is
not properly guided by international policies.
We then investigate the impact which a world migration institute might have on the stock
of global migrants. In this setting we allow the institute to internalize the snowball eﬀects
which the migrants themselves have on the global climate and we allow the institute to
take the total costs of migration into account. We look at two social welfare functions, a
utilitarian one and an egalitarian one, the solution of both then being compared to the one
obtained in the laissez-faire economy. We notice that, given our benchmark calibration,
the utilitarian institute is likely to choose more world migration even if its preference
toward the North is relatively low. Similarly, the egalitarian institute will choose a larger
stock of world migrants which we believe is due to the relatively low migration costs.
We also analyze what eﬀect a softer immigration policy and investment in greener technol-
ogy might have on the long-run number of migrants, on the environment and North-South
inequality. Both policies could be undertaken for diﬀerent reasons. Whereas we inter-
pret the softer immigration policy as an aftercare policy which makes the North take its
responsibility for the eﬀects of climate change which it itself imposed upon the South,
the investment in greener technology can easily be understood as a precautionary or fore-
thought policy. We show that the immigration policy clearly increases the number of
migrants but worsens climate change and has an ambiguous eﬀect on North-South in-
equality. On the contrary, the investment in greener technology leads to fewer long-run
migrants, a better environment, but again an ambiguous sign for the inequality measure.
It is therefore clear that any policy undertaken by the North will depend on the impor-
tance which the North places upon displacement of people, climate change or inequality.
Importantly, the qualitative results do not depend on whether the costs of the policies
are sunk in the future or whether the policies incur continuous costs. With a numerical
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example we show that the US would prefer to invest in immigration policy, whereas the
EU would prefer to invest in green technology, a result which stems from the diﬀerences
in production technologies.
There are many extensions which this model could see. Firstly, it should be interesting to
analyze the short-run migration decisions and compare these to the long-run choices. Since
we know that a policy which has positive eﬀects in the long-run might have signiﬁcant
costs in the short-run, it can be important to compare the costs and beneﬁts of both.
Furthermore, though in the long-run this is clearly unimportant, in the short-run we
could see signiﬁcant impacts of population growth. Including this in this model will pose
challenging problems.
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